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WAS THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
CONDITIONED ON SERVICE IN AN ORGANIZED
MILITIA?
Randy E. Barnett*
ABSTRACT: Those who deny that the original meaning of the Second
Amendment protected an individual right to keep and bear arms on a par
with the rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly no longer claim
that the amendment refers only to a “collective right” of states to
maintain their militias. Instead, they now claim that the right, although
belonging to individuals, was conditioned on service in an organized
militia. With the demise of organized militias, they contend, the right
lost any relevance to constitutional adjudication. In this essay, I
evaluate the case made for this historical claim by Richard Uviller and
William Merkel in their book, “The Militia and the Right to Arms, or,
How the Second Amendment Fell Silent.” I also evaluate their denial
that the original meaning of Fourteenth Amendment protected an
individual right to arms unconditioned on militia service. I find both
claims inconsistent with the available evidence of original meaning and
also, perhaps surprisingly, with existing federal law.
Who says that even heated conflicts over constitutional meaning can never
progress? Over the past ten years, the intellectual clash between those who
claimed that, at the time of the founding, the “right to keep and bear arms”
protected by the Second Amendment was a “collective right” of states to preserve
their militia and those who maintain instead that it originally referred to an
individual right akin to the others protected in the Bill of Rights has been
resolved. That the individual right view prevailed definitively is evidenced by
the fact that no Second Amendment scholar, no matter how inimical to gun
rights, makes the “collective right” claim any more. All now agree that the
Second Amendment originally referred to the right of the individual.
Indeed, the fact that the collective right theory was once so confidently
advanced by gun control enthusiasts is on its way down the collective memory
hole as though it had never been asserted. With its demise, the intellectual debate
over the original meaning of the Second Amendment has now turned in a
different direction. Although now conceding that the right to keep and bear arms
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indeed belongs to individuals rather than to states, almost without missing a
beat, gun control enthusiasts now with equal assurance claim that the individual
right to bear arms was somehow “conditioned” in its exercise by participation in
an organized militia.
The ‘militia-conditioned individual right’ theory represents an advance for
the anti-gun-rights position. It obviates (a) the copious evidence, both direct and
circumstantial, developed by scholars over the past ten or more years that “the
right to keep and bear arms” belonged to individuals,1 and (b) the lack of any
direct evidence that the Second Amendment protected some sort of a never-verywell-specified power of states, while (c) allowing opponents of gun rights to
maintain, as they did with the “collective right” theory, that the Second
Amendment is irrelevant to the constitutionality of modern gun laws. But is it
supported by the available evidence?
The latest to make this historical claim are Richard Uviller and William
Merkel. In their book, “The Militia and the Right to Arms, or, How the Second
Amendment Fell Silent,” Uviller and Merkel reject the collective right theory and
characterize the Second Amendment “right to keep and bear arms” as an
individual right. However, they further claim that, because the right to arms may
be exercised only while participating as part of an organized militia, its existence
as a constitutional right is conditioned on the continued existence of a wellregulated militia. With the demise of the organized militia, so too has vanished
the right to keep and bear arms. In their words, “historical developments have
altered a vital condition for the articulated right to keep and bear arms.”2
In this essay, I will comment briefly on the authors’ interpretive
methodology before moving on to discuss specific problems with their effort to
interpret the Second Amendment. One of the peculiarities of the modern debate
over the Second Amendment is its single-minded preoccupation with the issue of
original meaning or original intent. This is odd because, to my knowledge, none
of the right-limiting theorists are themselves originalists, and consequently they
would surely not limit, for example, their interpretation of the First Amendment
by its original meaning. But as the modern academic debate over the Second
Amendment is entirely an historical one, in this essay, I limit my attention to this
issue.
I will confine myself to evidence, some of which not previously considered
in this debate, that specifically negates the claim that the Second Amendment
protected a militia-conditioned individual right. I should stress that I do not
reiterate here the other direct and circumstantial evidence that supports an
1

For a succinct summary of this evidence, see U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 236–59
(5th Cir. 2001).
2
H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS,
OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 35 (2002).

3
individual, as opposed to a “collective” right, but the full strength of the
individual right position cannot fully be appreciated without taking this evidence
into account along with that presented here.3
I. THE AUTHORS’ ORIGINALISM
Uviller and Merkel (hereinafter “the authors) are to be commended for
explicitly discussing their method of interpretation. Few law professors and even
fewer historians even attempt this. Unfortunately, I found their discussion of
interpretation rather confused. Increasingly, originalists like myself focus
entirely on the original meaning of the text — that is, the meaning that would
have been attached to the words used in the text by a reasonable speaker of the
language at the time of its enactment.4 What did “militia” mean in 1791? Or
“well-regulated” or “arms” or “bear” or “right” or “the people”? Of course
speakers then, like speakers today, would be influenced by the context in which a
particular word or phrase is used. For example, because of the context of the
Second Amendment, we can be quite sure that the term “arms” refers to
weapons, not the appendages to which our hands are attached.
Discerning the original public meaning of the text requires an examination of
linguistic usage among those who wrote and ratified the text as well as the
general public to whom the Constitution was addressed. Evidence of specialized
meaning or intent by framers or ratifiers is only relevant if it is shown that such
specialized meaning would have been known and assumed by a member of the
general public. Where more than one contemporary meaning is identified, it
becomes necessary to establish which meaning was dominant. Any such
historical claim is an empirical one that requires actual evidence of usage to
substantiate. If possible, a quantitative assessment to distinguish normal from
abnormal usage should be undertaken.5
3
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Of course, once discerned, the original public meaning of the text, like the
public meaning of laws enacted yesterday, must be applied to facts of particular
cases. Though general language of the sort used in the Constitution may exclude
many possible outcomes, often it does not dictate a unique result, thus leaving
room for considerable discretion in developing legal doctrines by those applying
original meaning to particular cases or controversies. This activity of applying
meaning to cases by means of intermediary doctrines is better described as
constitutional construction, rather than as interpretation of text strictly speaking.6
The need for construction is the unavoidable cost of using language, especially
general abstract language, to guide behavior. On the other hand, the benefit of
general language is that, even with no deviation from its original meaning, it can
last a very long time without becoming antiquated.
Sometimes it sounds like the authors are endorsing an original-publicmeaning approach, but that is not what they practice. In particular, the authors
present very little evidence of the public meaning of the words used in the
Constitution and, where disagreement exists, little quantitative evidence by
which to distinguish dominant from deviant meaning. They seem instead to be
searching for what is better described as original intent, rather than original
meaning.
Those originalists who favor original intent want to fill the gaps in the
original public meaning and cabin the discretion of those engaged in construction
of abstract provisions by appealing to the specific intentions of those who either
wrote or ratified them. This version of originalism has been roundly criticized
for reasons I shall not rehearse here, many of which I think are sound.7 Given the
fact that the Framers did not actually contemplate most instances in which their
words would be applied, in practice the search for specific original intentions
usually consists of what I call “channeling the framers” to discern what they
“would have” thought of a particular case or controversy. This converts
originalism from an historical and factual inquiry to a speculative and
counterfactual one. There is simply no factual answer to the question of what the
founders would have thought of a particular matter. For this reason, such claims
can neither be empirically established, nor refuted.

particular word at issue. For example, the term “necessary” is too common to establish by
quantitative survey a dominant public meaning to which the Necessary and Proper Clause
must have referred. One must then fall back on more traditional reliance on statements of
various participants in the historical period about the clause in question. See, e.g., Randy
E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 183 (2003).
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While in places, the authors appear to reject this approach—for example,
when they repeatedly cite the work of H. Jefferson Powell with approval—this
rejection is not practiced consistently,8 as demonstrated by their heavy and
uncritical reliance on the works of such original-intent authors as Raoul Berger.9
The authors also seem to be unaware that the historical evidence cited by Powell
actually supports the conclusion that the founding generation, while rejecting
original-intent originalism, ended up favoring original-meaning interpretation.10
Finally, in contrast with both original meaning and original intent
originalists, there are the new-fangled “translation theory” originalists, such as
Larry Lessig and Michael Treanor, who start with original meaning or intent (its
not always clear which) to discern the principles underlying the text, and then
purport to “translate” those principles — but not the text itself — into the modern
day context.11 While this does not sound like the method they endorse, nor
practice in most cases, they nevertheless also cite Larry Lessig’s work with
approval without seeming to appreciate the difference between his approach and
that of other originalists.12
As I said, their discussion of methodology is confusing but perhaps no more
so than the well-known historian Jack Rakove, a nonoriginalist, whose discussion
of interpretive methodology the authors also say they found helpful.13 Uviller
and Merkel seem not to realize that originalism has quite differing and competing
strains or, if they do, they do not consistently keep within one method or another.
Their erratic methodology renders it hard to respond to their interpretive claims
since they might, for example, present evidence of intent that, while valid as far
as it goes, is irrelevant to the public meaning of the text or, at a minimum, is not
dispositive.
As it turns out, the obvious source of this confusion stems from the fact that
the authors are not themselves originalists, although they never disclose this to
8
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the reader.14 They therefore fall into the large class of non-originalists who
make originalist arguments, one assumes, to persuade others who care more
about original meaning than they do. This probably describes every opponent of
the individual-rights interpretation of the Second Amendment who offers
historical evidence that this interpretation is in error.15 Even the professional
historians among the opponents of the individual-rights interpretation who insist,
like the authors, on a crabbed originalist interpretation for the right to bear arms
— a right of which they disapprove— would never think to apply this method to
limit other constitutional rights they like.16
If, however, as the authors themselves believe, courts need not and often
should not follow original meaning, then courts are perfectly free to adopt a
robust individual-rights interpretation of the Second Amendment even if this
should contradict its original meaning. Uviller and Merkel do not, of course,
consider this implication of rejecting originalism.
So far as I could tell, the authors present no new evidence of the original
meaning of the Second Amendment and confine themselves to reliance on
secondary sources or evidence already well-known to Second Amendment
scholars of all stripes. There is nothing wrong with offering a new interpretation
of previously discussed evidence, of course, but readers should not begin this
book expecting to find anything that has not been previously considered by other
writers in the field. Nothing new has been uncovered to change the debate. And
14

I learned for the first time that they are not originalists during their talks at the
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See, e.g., Keith A. Erhman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the
Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5
(1989); Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 309 (1998).
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I know of no historian or law professor who, in offering an originalist critique of the
individual rights position, has ever used an originalist method to limit the scope of any
other right in the Bill of Rights, though someone may have escaped my attention.
Historian Jack Rakove — the author of Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the
Making of the Constitution (New York: Vintage 1997) — for example, has never claimed
to be an originalist. See, e.g., Jack Rakove, Words, Deeds, and Guns: Arming American
and the Second Amendment, 59 WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY 205 (Jan. 2002) at
http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/wm/59.1/rakove.html (“[I]t would be difficult
to identify any clause of the Constitution more open to the common sense objection that
its modern interpretation should not be rooted in the concept of ‘original intent’ or
‘original understanding,’ simply because firearms are now far more devastating than
anyone in the eighteenth century could have plausibly imagined.”).
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unfortunately for a book-length work, the authors do not treat comprehensively
all the available evidence of original meaning. This is particularly regrettable as
the quantity of such historical evidence is not so great that all of it could not have
been evaluated in the space of a monograph.
Let me turn now from generalities to particulars, for it will come as no
surprise to those familiar with my writings in this area17 to learn that I am not
persuaded by their originalist arguments and therefore disagree with their
conclusions. Most of the book is taken up with a lengthy and largely
uncontroversial description of the history of the militia before and after the
adoption of the Constitution, along with a discussion of classical republicanism,
so the book’s treatment of the Second Amendment is actually rather brief. Their
conclusion that the individual right to arms is conditioned on service in an
organized militia rests on a few claims I shall treat separately.
First, that “bear arms” had an exclusively military connotation. Second, that,
as a textual matter, the first part of the amendment places a condition on the
exercise of the right specified in the second part. Third, that the “Privileges or
Immunities” of the Fourteenth Amendment does not include a protection of an
individual non-militia-based right to keep and bear arms. Fourth, that the
practical significance of finding the right to bear arms to be an unconditional
individual right is to protect an absolute right to be free of any regulation
whatsoever no matter how reasonable. Though this last claim hardly seems
relevant to their historical claims, they repeat it in sometimes intemperate tones
throughout the work. Finally, the authors conclude that the general militia
referenced in the Second Amendment no longer exists. On all five counts, they
err.
II. WAS “BEAR ARMS” EXCLUSIVELY A MILITARY TERM?
The authors claim that: “Bearing arms implied making muster, equipped and
ready for service; keeping entailed steady readiness to serve when called to
duty.”18 For this proposition they reference with uncritical approval Garry Wills’
essay in The New York Review of Books by stating that “bearing arms had, from
its earliest recorded employment and through the late eighteenth century, an
exclusively military connotation.”19 From Wills the authors conclude that “the
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verb ‘to bear’ . . . would not have been used in the eighteenth century — as it
would not commonly be today — to connote purely private use of arms.”20
It is not enough, however, to present numerous examples of the use of “bear
arms” in a military context to demonstrate that this is its exclusive use. Claims of
exclusivity are hard to establish empirically because it must be shown that there
are no other competing uses of a particular word. Just a few counterexamples
call such a claim into question and then force those making it to do a systematic
survey to distinguish normal from abnormal or deviant uses. Individual rights
scholars have pointed to several instances of the term “bear arms” being used in a
nonmilitary context.
A. Early Uses of “Bear Arms” Outside the Military Context
One important example, overlooked by the authors, is “A Bill for the
Preservation of Deer” drafted by Thomas Jefferson and presented by James
Madison to the Virginia General Assembly in October of 1785. The bill
prohibited the taking of deer under certain circumstances and ends with the
following stricture:
. . . and if, within twelve months after the date of the recognizance he
shall bear a gun out of his inclosed ground, unless whilst performing
military duty, it shall be deemed a breach of the recognizance, and be
good cause to bind him a new, and every such bearing of a gun shall be a
breach of the new recognizance and cause him to be bound again.21
Here “bear a gun” is clearly being used in a nonmilitary context, as it
exempts military bearing of a gun from the prohibition imposed on those who
previously violated the act. (Note, however, that even offenders my still “bear a
gun” on their own property.)
Garry Wills dismisses this highly inconvenient statute with some too-fancy
footwork: “Not only the context is different from the amendment’s, but the
‘bearing of a gun’ is not the canonical formulation with a plural noun.”22 As to
the first part of this sentence, Wills fails to note that the statute which he claims
uses the term in a different context, exempts military duty from the scope of its
prohibition, showing that it would otherwise be included in “bearing a gun.” In
rejecting the relevance of this statute on the ground that the context differs he
John Lattimer, and for Wills reply, see To Keep and Bear Arms: An Exchange, THE NEW
YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Nov. 16, 1995, at 61-64).
20
UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 2, at 149.
21
2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 443 (Julian P. Boyd, ed., 1950)(emphases added).
22
Wills, supra note 19, at 64-65.
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also assumes his conclusion: that the Second Amendment was exclusively
military, a conclusion based in part on his contention that “bear arms” is
exclusively military. But the statute is offered precisely to show that the term
“bear arms” had a nonmilitary usage, in this case that of hunting. So the statute
undermines Wills’ claim that the context of the Second Amendment is indeed
different, and his reassertion of the “context” point to refute this inference is a
non sequitur.
As for the second part, Wills is echoing a point he makes earlier in his review
that “One does not ‘bear arm.’ Latin arma is, etymologically, war “equipment”
and has no singular forms.”23 Will has been misled by a species of language
known to philosophers as a “mass noun.”24 Mass nouns, like “equipment,” are
useful because you need a term that will describe a class of items with`out
limiting oneself to particular types of the class. Take the word “luggage.” You
can say “pieces of luggage” or “suit case” but there is no singular of luggage, i.e.
you do not say, hand me that “lugg.” A “right to luggage” would not,
grammatically, be a right that could only be exercised collectively or en masse.
Though ostensibly plural in form, the term “arms” is functioning here as a mass
noun. The founders would not want to have used the plural of gun, for example,
since the term “arms” also includes edge weapons as well as weapons to be
invented in the future. The fact that there is no singular of “arms” tells us exactly
nothing about its application. Wills argument might be dubbed a grammatical
fallacy.25
While concerning only one type of arms—guns—the statute also refutes
Wills’ claim that “[o]ne does not bear arms against a rabbit.”26 However strange
it may sound to his ears, it is undeniable that both Jefferson and Madison did not
think it odd to say that one does “bear a gun” to hunt deer. So do others of their
contemporaries discussed below whose statements to this effect are dismissed by
23

Id. at 64.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “mass noun” as “a noun denoting something,
such as a substance or a quality, which cannot be counted; esp. (in the English language)
a noun which lacks a plural in ordinary usage and is not used with the indefinite article
(opposed to count noun).”
25
Another such fallacy is the claim that “commerce” in the Commerce Clause had a
narrow meaning excluding manufacturing because you would not speak of
“manufacturing among the several states.” But this awkwardness is caused by the
meaning of “among the several states” that limits the type of activities to those that could
be conducted across state lines. Though it is true that the original meaning of
“commerce” did exclude manufacturing, this is established by direct evidence of usage
and the grammatical awkwardness of substituting “manufacturing” for “commerce” in the
Commerce Clause tells us nothing about its original meaning. See Barnett, The Original
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, supra note 5 at 112-13.
26
Wills, supra note 19, at 64.
24
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Wills and by the authors because they do not fit the authors’ and Wills’
opinion about the historical “context.”
The authors (and Wills) fail to discuss the first learned treatise on the
Constitution authored by the jurist and law professor St. George Tucker in his
annotated edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries published in 1803 and based on
lectures he gave in the 1790s.27 There, Tucker offers the following example of
judicial review under the Necessary and Proper Clause:
If, for example, congress were to pass a law prohibiting any person
from bearing arms, as a means of preventing insurrections, the judicial
courts, under the construction of the words necessary and proper, here
contended for, would be able to pronounce decidedly upon the
constitutionality of these means. But if congress may use any means,
which they choose to adopt, the provision in the constitution which
secures to the people the right of bearing arms, is a mere nullity; and
any man imprisoned for bearing arms under such an act, might be
without relief; because in that case, no court could have any power to
pronounce on the necessity or propriety of the means adopted by
congress to carry any specified power into complete effect.28
Tucker here is clearly discussing the right to keep and bear arms outside of any
militia context and he ignores entirely the preface to the Amendment.
Another important counterexample to their thesis that “bear arms” had an
exclusively military meaning that the authors do discuss is the recommendation
of the minority report of the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention that the
Constitution be amended to include the following:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves
and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing
game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of
them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury
from individuals; and as standing armies in the time of peace are
dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military
27

The omission is curious as Tucker is discussed in articles cited and criticized by Uveller
and Merkel. They would have had to have skip over this quote to reach the quotation
from the later treatise by Joseph Story, which they choose to discuss at some length. See
UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 2, at 30–31 (discussing Barnett & Kates, supra note17,
at 1220).
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ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMONWEALTH
OF VIRGINIA 289 (1803) (emphases added).
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shall be kept under strict subordination to and governed by the civil
power.29
The authors readily concede that this proposal clearly uses “bear arms” to
include both nonmilitary (“defense of themselves,” “for the purpose of killing
game”) and military (“and their own state”) contexts, thus undercutting the claim
that “bear arms” had an exclusively military connotation, but repeatedly dismiss
it as reflecting a “marginal voice[],”30 “disaffected minority,”31 and “some
radical, libertarian support for an unrestricted right to weapons.”32 They claim
that the minority report’s “view of arms-related rights did not represent majority
opinion in Pennsylvania,”33 adding heatedly that “the assertion of an individual
right to arms for purposes beyond service in the lawful state militia may have
resonated with some groups of anarchic radicals, but that majority sentiment and
enlightened reason failed to embrace constitutional claims for such a right in
Pennsylvania.”34 They even go so far as to claim that “[t]hese supporters of [a]
constitutional right to own weapons for private purposes were atypical even
within the anti-federalist movement, and they remained insignificant within the
nation as a whole.”35 One suspects from their vehement denunciation of these
delegates that the authors think this proposal of the Pennsylvania minority hurts
their case badly.
But for all this sound and fury, it is remarkable that the authors offer little, if
any, evidence or secondary support for these claims about popular opinion.36
Perhaps they base these claims on the fact that this is a recommendation made by
a “minority” of delegates to the Pennsylvania convention, but it is well known
that several of the earlier constitutional conventions were packed by the
comparatively well-organized Federalists. The fact this particular sentiment was
held by a minority of delegates tells us next to nothing about whether it reflects
29

NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 182 (1997) (emphasis added).
UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 2, at 82.
31
Id. at 83.
32
Id.
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Id. at 83.
34
Id. at 85.
35
Id. at 81. See also id. at 91 (referring to “the radical fringe”); id. at 100 (referring to “a
few radicals outside Congress”); id. at 241 n.71 (“[T]hese endorsements almost
invariably issue from the pens of marginal, radical figures who did not represent the
mainstream of either federal or antifederal thought.”).
36
The only footnote references are to an article by Saul Cornell that does not make any
claims about majority versus minority sentiments on the pages cited and to a Fifth Circuit
decision, United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), that does not
characterize the list of sources for the individual right to bear arms as radical or minority
voices.
30
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the common view among Pennsylvanians at large. Further, this individualist
view of the right to keep and bear arms could easily have reflected the view of
the majority of delegates themselves who nevertheless supported ratifying the
Constitution without amendments.
Indeed, the strategy of ratification
conventions proposing amendments to Congress developed later in the
ratification process.37 Evidence is required to establish the author’s dismissive
claims, but none on this point is offered.
When characterizing the Pennsylvania minority report as reflecting the views
of wild anarchical deviants, the authors fail to mention the wording of the rightto-arms provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 that reads: “That the
people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state. . . .”38
This right was reaffirmed in the 1790 Constitution in a passage that reads: “That
the right of citizens to bear arms, in defense of themselves and the state, shall not
be questioned.”39 In addition to using the same phraseology as the Pennsylvania
minority, neither provision in these enacted state constitutions even mentions the
militia. So there is good reason to believe that the Pennsylvania dissenters were
merely elaborating the individual, non-militia conditioned, right to bear arms
already included in their state constitution. In fairness then, the Pennsylvania
dissenters can hardly be “discount[ed] . . . as the rambling catch-all compendium
of one man bent on scuttling ratification”40 without some evidence that this was
so.
Nor was the Pennsylvania minority alone in attempting to amend the
constitution to protect a individual right-to-arms not conditioned on militia
service. Included in the minority recommendation of the Massachusetts
Convention was this proposed amendment:
[The] Constitution be never construed . . . to prevent the people of the
United States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own
arms, or to raise standing armies, unless when necessary for the
defence of the United States, or of some one or more of them; or to
prevent the people from petitioning, in a peaceable and orderly
37

The Pennsylvania Convention, the second to ratify the Constitution, did so on
December 12, 1787. The first state convention to append proposed amendments was
Massachusetts — the sixth state to ratify — which voted for ratification on February 6,
1788. After Massachusetts, all the remaining seven states, except Maryland, proposed
amendments to the Constitution along with their vote to ratify. These proposals can be
accessed online from the Avalon Project at Yale Law School, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/ avalon/18th.htm.
38
COGAN, supra note 29, at 184 (emphasis added). The Vermont Constitution of 1777
contains identical language. Id. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. XV.
39
Id. (emphasis added).
40
UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 2, at 270 n.90.
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manner, the federal legislature, for a redress of grievances; or to subject
the people to unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons,
papers or possessions.41
As in Pennsylvania, this proposal does not explicitly mention the militia. The
right to arms appears among a list of purely individual rights, none of which are
in any way conditioned upon service in the militia.
In addition, the New Hampshire ratification convention officially proposed
that the Constitution be amended to read that “Congress shall never disarm any
Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion.”42 Uviller and
Merkel grudgingly concede that this proposal “might support the argument that a
private right to gun possession is protected.”43 It should also be noted that none
of the other right-to-arms proposals made by New York, North Carolina,
Virginia, or Rhode Island were expressly limited to “the common defense” or
“the defense of the state,”44 though, as the authors note, the Massachusetts Bill of
Rights was qualified in this way.45
Uviller and Merkel should be estopped from responding that the language in
the Pennsylvania and Vermont constitutions does not reflect an individual right
that may be exercised both within and outside of militia service, as their
interpretation of these passages is inconsistent with such an argument.46 When
discussing the later Kentucky case of Bliss v. Commonwealth,47 in which the
court interprets the very same language in the Kentucky Constitution as
protecting an individual right, the authors readily concede it does indeed have
this broader meaning. They respond by distinguishing it on the ground that this
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COGAN, supra note 29, at 181 (emphasis added). This recommendation is in contrast
with the Massachusetts state constitution that protected only the right to bear arms “for
the common defense.” Id. at 183; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XIII.
42
Id. at 181 (emphasis added). The authors claim, again without evidence, that this
proposal “sought to push the republic further than any of the other states desired to go.”
UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 2, at 82.
43
UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 2, at 82 (emphasis added). Even a single example of a
patently individual right to bear arms rebuts a charge commonly made by collective
rights proponents, and now by militia-conditioned individual rights proponents, that the
unconditioned individual rights formulation is a pure invention of modern gun rights
scholars with no basis in history.
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COGAN, supra note 29, at 181–82.
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UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 2, at 82.
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Others not so constrained may contend that “in defense of themselves” was still a
collective notion referring to “the community,” and such defense was to be done entirely
within the context of the militia. I address this claim—which is not made by Uviller and
Merkel—infra in Part II D.
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12 Ky. 90, 2 Litt. 90 (1822).
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wording differs from that of the Second Amendment.48 By striking down a
law banning concealed weapons, they note that “the [Kentucky] Court of Appeals
acknowledged a private, state constitutional right for purposes having nothing to
with militia service.”49
The authors also dismiss the 1846 Georgia case of Nunn v. Georgia, in which
the state judge found a law banning certain pistols to be unconstitutional under
both the Georgia constitution and the Second Amendment.50 Here the authors
criticize the judge for not considering himself sufficiently bound by the “revered”
John Marshall’s earlier opinion in Barron v. Baltimore51 in which he held that the
Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government.52 “[F]or those who seek a
coherent doctrine,” they write, “Nunn v. Georgia is a case of no importance
whatever.”53 But coherent doctrine is not why we look to Nunn. Rather Nunn is
significant because the claim that the right to keep and bear arms was thought to
exist only in the context of militia service is inconsistent with its holding.
Moreover, in their dismissal of Nunn, Uviller and Merkel fail to appreciate
that many then viewed the Bill of Rights, at least in part, as declaratory of
preexisting rights and therefore as good authority to anyone, including a state
court, trying to ascertain what the fundamental rights of persons might be.54
Strictly speaking, Barron merely deprives the rights specified in the Bill of
Rights of federal protection. The Court does not hold that these rights do not
also apply to the states, should state courts so decide. However this issue is
decided, the opinion in Nunn still stands as an example of the right to bear arms
being interpreted as an individual right outside the military context.
Surprisingly, nowhere in their book do they discuss how the right to keep and
bear arms related to the natural right of self-defense, though the wording of the
Pennsylvania Constitution and other statements invokes a right of “defense.”55
Instead, the authors claim that the right-to-arms “did not readily lend itself to
Locke’s rational and enlightened discourse about the nature of man and the
entitlements appurtenant thereto.”56 That the right to keep and bear arms was
48

See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 2, at 28.
Id. The authors then gratuitously observe that subsequent Kentucky constitutions
expressly “allowed the legislature to pass gun control laws.” Id. This further
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protected an individual right free of militia connotation.
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See 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
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32 U.S. 243 (1833)
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See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 2, at 28–30.
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Id. at 30.
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See AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 147–56
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viewed as an extension of the fundamental natural right of self defense is
much discussed in the literature but is cursorily dismissed in this book.
The authors attempt to mitigate Nunn v. Georgia by discussing the 1840
Tennessee case of Aymette v. State.57 In Aymette, the court upheld a ban on the
wearing of a concealed bowie-knife, reasoning that “[t]hese weapons would be
useless in war. They could not be employed advantageously in the common
defence of the citizens. The right to keep and bear them is not, therefore, secured
by the constitution.”58 Uviller and Merkel claim that the state constitutional
provision in question was “similar in form and words to the federal Second
Amendment.”59 But unlike the Second Amendment (and the other proposed
amendments and state right-to-arms provisions discussed above), the Tennessee
provision qualified the right to bear arms by the phrase “for their common
defense”60 and the court places great stress on this language in the passage quoted
by Uviller and Merkel.61 As the authors acknowledge elsewhere,62 this language
suggests a more military or mutual defense meaning.
In contrast to the language of the Tennessee constitution, however, the
Senate rejected a proposal to add the qualifier “for the common defense” to the
language of the Second Amendment.63 While the authors dismiss the
significance of the Senate’s refusal on the ground that this qualifying language
was redundant,64 their assertion requires independent proof that the unqualified
right is already limited to uses of arms for the common defense and does not also
include the use of arms by the people in defense of themselves as several state
constitutions specified. In other words, only if you assume that you have
established the meaning of the right to keep and bear arms can you contend that
57

21 Tenn. 154 (1840)
Id. at __. The authors are wrong to claim that individual rights scholars are guilty of
“[i]gnoring the case from Tennessee.” UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 2, at 27. It is
widely discussed in the Second Amendment literature. See e.g. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK,
THAT EVERY MANY BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 94
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Tenn Reports (5 Yerg.) 356, 360 (1833))(emphasis added).
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See id. at 104.
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See id. at 103.
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this additional language was superfluous. Equally if not more plausible is the
inference that the qualifying language might well have been rejected because it
unduly narrowed the scope of the right. In the absence of any recorded debate,
we just do not know.
B. Evidence That the Right “to Keep” Arms is Not Military
To determine original meaning, as opposed to original intent, the cryptic and
unreported Senate deliberations are far less important than the existence of state
constitutional right-to-arms guarantees that included the broader “defense of
themselves” language. A member of the public in 1791 reading the Second
Amendment would not likely assume that the unqualified right in the
Amendment actually meant something narrower than the broad right to arms for
both personal and collective self-defense already protected by some state
constitutions.
Take, for example, the reaction to Madison’s proposed amendments by
Samuel Nasson, an Antifederalist representative to the Massachusetts ratification
convention. In a letter to George Thatcher, a Federalist Congressman from
Massachusetts, Nasson wrote:
I find that Ammendments [sic] are once again on the Carpet. I hope that
such may take place as will be for the Best Interest of the whole. A Bill
of Rights well secured that we the people may know how far we may
Proceade in Every Department then their will be no Dispute Between the
people and rulers in that may be secured the right to keep arms for
Common and Extraordinary Occations such as to secure ourselves
against the wild Beast and also to amuse us by fowling and for our
Defence against a Common Enemy. . . .65
Nasson then goes on to extol the virtue of popular resistance to a “foreign foe”
and condemn standing armies in time of peace.66 Notwithstanding his concern
for the common defense, Nasson nevertheless reads a right to keep arms in the
Second Amendment as also a personal one unconnected with militia service.
Note also, contra Wills, the use of “arms” for hunting.
This quote goes unmentioned by Uviller and Merkel though it appears in the
Fifth Circuit’s opinion in U.S. v. Emerson,67 an opinion they much discuss and
65

Letter from Samuel Nasson to George Thatcher (July 9, 1789) in CREATING THE BILL
RIGHTS: DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 260–61
(Helen E. Veit, et al. eds., 1991) (emphasis added).
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See id.
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disparage.68 Instead of letting readers make up their own minds about such
contemporary statements, this highly inconvenient direct evidence of original
meaning is dismissed by the authors in a single conclusory sentence: “Contrary to
many commentators and to our own interpretation, the court finds ‘numerous
instances’ where the words were employed to connote private carrying for
private purposes. Accordingly, they [sic] conclude that the term refers to
carrying or wearing arms generally.”69
That Nasson was not alone in this individualist reading of the right to arms is
evidenced by an earlier letter from Massachusetts historian and pastor Jeremy
Belknap to Federalist Paine Wingate in May of 1789. Belknap writes of his
pleasure with Samuel Adams’ investiture speech as lieutenant governor in which
Adams affirmed that:
“The people may enjoy well grounded confidence that their personal
& domestic rights are secure.” This is the same Language or nearly
the same which he used in the [Massachusetts ratification] Convention
when he moved for an addition to the proposed Amendments — by
inserting a clause to provide for the Liberty of the press — the right to
keep arms — Protection from seizure of person & property & the
Rights of Conscience.”70
As it turned out, none of these “personal and domestic” rights were included
among the amendments proposed by the Massachusetts convention. Would
anyone, however, fairly conclude from this omission that the liberty of the press
or the right of conscience were supported only by a minority or radical fringe of
the population of Massachusetts? More importantly, these two contemporary
letters join the ranks of other direct statements about public meaning of the
Second Amendment or the right to keep and bear arms indicating that it protected
a personal individual right like the other rights in the Bill of Rights.
These statements by Nasson and Belknap, along with the previously quoted
proposal from the Massachusetts minority, highlight a signal fact overlooked by
the authors, and by others who now base their historical argument on the
supposedly military meaning of “bear arms”: The Second Amendment also
protects the right to keep arms. No evidence is presented by the authors to show
that “keep” was a military term at all, much less exclusively so. These references
to a personal, individual right “to keep arms” is significant, therefore, because
68
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even if “bear arms” did have an exclusively military connotation, the
individual and nonmilitary right to “keep” arms still colors the meaning of the
Second Amendment as a whole, giving it a nonmilitary meaning as well.
Perhaps because they had not previously been discussed in the Second
Amendment literature, Wills fails to consider any of these examples in his
exposition on the meaning of “to keep.”71 The best counter-example he can
produce is a statement in which John Trenchard “advised that ‘a competent
number of them (firelocks) be kept in every parish for the young men to exercise
with on holidays.”72 That “kept” can be used in a military context, however, does
not give the word itself a military connotation. “Truck” can be used in a military
context too, but that does not make the word itself military, much less
exclusively military. That arms can be “kept” in an armory, as of course they
can, does not mean that they cannot also be “kept” at home.73
Wills concludes: “To separate one term from this context and treat it as
specifying a different right (of home possession) is to impart into the language
something foreign to each term in itself, to the consequences of terms, and to the
entire context of Madison’s sentence.”74 But given his lack of evidence, Wills’
argument concerning “to keep” really boils down to his tenuous claim that “bear
arms” is exclusively military and therefore so too must “to keep” be military
when conjoined with it. With Nasson, Belknap and the authors of the
71

It is typical in this debate for the individual rights scholars to produce the direct
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English noun, ‘keep’ meant the permanently holdable part of a castle. . . .” Id at 67 n. 14.
Fair minded reader can decide for themselves if Wills is being sensitive here to “context,”
and whether these uses of “keep” in any way detract from the significance of the use of
“keep arms” by Nasson and Belknap. Or might Wills himself be guilty of what he
accuses individual rights scholars: “seeking out every odd, loose, or idiosyncratic” use of
a term “in defiance of the solid body of central references” (id. at 64), or what he dubs the
“throw-in-the-kitchen-sink approach”(id. at 65)?
73
It is perhaps useful to remember that, in 1995, Wills was writing before gun rights
opponents had made the transition from the “collective right” of states interpretation of
the Second Amendment to the new “militia-conditioned individual right” theory. Hence,
he still is claiming that the original meaning of the Second Amendment in the Bill of
Rights was to protect the rights of states to have a militia—the view now rejected by
writers such as Uviller and Merkel. See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 2, at 12.
Additional evidence is needed to fully refute this claim. For a summary, see U.S. v.
Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 236–59 (5th Cir. 2001). Wills work is still worth mentioning,
however, because writers like Uviller and Merkel still rely heavily on his New York
Review of Books essay that “bear arms” was an exclusively military term.
74
Id. at 68.

19
Massachusetts minority report, however, we have actual members of the
public at the founding using the right to keep arms and describing it as a
nonmilitary right. Appeals to “context” cannot silence these contemporary
statements. If anything, conjoining the right to bear arms with the nonmilitary
right to keep arms renders them both nonmilitary in this context, but there is no
reason to insist on so narrow a definition.
These statements—like others relied upon by individual rights scholars I do
not reiterate here75—are direct evidence of what the public thought the phrase
“the right to keep and bear arms” in the Second Amendment meant. Unlike the
authorities relied upon by Uviller and Merkel (or Wills), they are not statements
merely evincing a concern for the militia, from which we are supposed to
circumstantially infer what the “right to keep and bear arms” might have meant.
These statements evidence what real people thought the specific words of the
Second Amendment objectively manifested to them. The dirty little secret of this
long-running debate is that only one side has produced any concrete examples of
actual statements from the founding era expressing their interpretation of the
right to keep and bear arms and the Second Amendment.
C. Evidence That To “Bear Arms” Meant to Carry Arms
Several times the authors assert, once again without evidence, that the term
“bear arms” was chosen because it did not connote the mere carrying of guns.
“In late-eighteenth century parlance, bearing arms was a term of art with an
obvious military connotation. ‘Carrying a gun’ lacks the implication of bearing
arms and, of course, the Constitution nowhere mentions a ‘right to carry a
gun.’”76 The 1785 edition of Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English
Language repeatedly defines “bear” as “carry.” After describing “bear” as a
“word used with such latitude that it is not easily explained,” its first meaning is
75
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UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 2, at 26–27. See also id. at 149 (The right to arms is
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the “care” that went into this verbal choice. That this phrase must have been carefully
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shown: that these other words would indeed have connoted a different meaning.

“To carry as a burden,” followed immediately by “To convey or carry,” “To
carry as a mark of distinction,” “To carry, as in show, and “To carry, as in trust.”
So “carry” seems to be the most prevalent synonym of “bear.” The same is true
for the first edition of Webster’s dictionary, which defined “bear”as “to bear,
carry, bring, sustain, produce, bring forth,” and mentions “to carry” five more
times in discussing the term’s derivation from other languages.77 So far as
Johnson and Webster are concerned, “to bear” simply means to carry or wear.
This usage is borne out in the context of the Second Amendment by the
earliest known reference to the right to arms by the Supreme Court that goes
unmentioned by Uviller and Merkel (or Wills), though the authors purport to
comprehensively discuss the few times that the Supreme Court has discussed the
Second Amendment—including even a television interview with Chief Justice
Warren Burger.78 In his infamous opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,79 Chief
Justice Taney denies that blacks could have been considered citizens of the
United States for, if this were the case, then blacks would enjoy along with
whites “the full liberty of speech . . . and to keep and carry arms wherever they
went.”80
In this passage, Justice Taney uses “carry” as a substitute or synonym for
“bear” and implies that the right protected by the Second Amendment is to carry
weapons wherever one travels, a right completely unconnected with active militia
service. Taney equates the right to keep and bear arms in the Second
Amendment with the equally nonmilitary liberty of speech protected by the First
Amendment. And he obviously thinks his readers would share his interpretation
of the Second Amendment, or his reductio ad absurdum for black citizenship
would fail.
The authors cannot have omitted Taney’s opinion because of its late date or
racist reasoning and outcome since they rely on the nearly-as-vile ruling in U.S.
v. Cruikshank, an even later opinion in which the Supreme Court frees some
members of the Ku Klux Klan who were convicted of violating the civil rights of
blacks in Louisiana by torturing and murdering them.81 According to the
reasoning of the Court in Cruikshank — cited approvingly by the authors — the
defendants could not have been guilty of violating the victims’ rights under color
of state law because the entire Bill of Rights, including the rights of assembly
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and to keep and bear arms, applies only to federal and not state exercises of
power.82
Although today we protect such liberties (ahistorically and incompletely) by
“incorporating” them into the Due Process Clause, as I discuss below in Part IV,
the protection of the right to arms against infringement by states is more properly
included within the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Clearly, however, if the later doctrine of
incorporation properly applies to the right of assembly, it can just as easily apply
to the right to arms, Cruikshank notwithstanding.
Some might object to the relevance of all the nineteenth-century cases I have
discussed for establishing original meaning of an amendment enacted in 1791,
and I sympathize with the objection. The farther in time one gets from
promulgation, the less germane is evidence of public meaning. I offer this
information because nineteenth-century cases are discussed at length by the
authors in their opening chapter and because they concede that these cases
interpreting the language “in defense of themselves and the state” represent the
antithesis of their view. This in turn is relevant to the meaning of the same
language used at the founding in right-to-arms provisions in state constitutions
discussed above.
Also, more recent cases are useful to establish the late development of a
collective or states-rights view of the amendment—a view unknown at the
founding and correctly rejected by the authors. Finally, Taney’s opinion in Dred
Scott refutes the authors’ suggestion that the Supreme Court has never
considered the Second Amendment to protect an individual right unconditioned
on militia service. In this, its earliest known mention of the Amendment, it
clearly did.
D. Was “Defense of themselves” Also Exclusively Military?
Before moving on to the next problem with Uviller and Merkel’s originalist
argument, let me briefly consider a different militia-conditioned interpretation of
“for the defense of themselves and the state” that they do not offer. As we just
saw, Uviller and Merkel concede that the wording of the Pennsylvania minority
report included a personal right to bear arms outside the militia context. That is
why they go to such lengths to marginalize these speakers. Someone else,
however, might claim that the phrase “for the defense of themselves” was the
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Fourteenth Amendment.

equivalent of “for the defense of the community,” a right that also was to be
exercised solely in the context of the militia.
Here is a brief list of the problems with this theory:
(1) First, and most importantly, I am aware of no direct evidence of anyone
at the time of the founding asserting that this is what “in defense of
themselves” means.
(2) As a textual matter, “in defense of themselves” seems most obviously to
be simply the plural of the personal right of self-defense, a usage that
was appropriate given that the subject of the right is the plural term “the
people.” In other words, if a drafter wanted to use the term “the people”
as they had in other amendments, and “the people” is the plural of
individual person, how else would the right to bear arms for personal
self-defense be protected besides making the second term “themselves?”
A drafter would not write “himselves,” or “him or herselves.”
(3) Indeed, this same grammatical choice is made in the Fourth Amendment
that refers to the right of “the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects. . . .”83 So here “the people” is being used as
the plural of individual person as reflected in the use of the word “their”
here — just like “themselves” in state constitutions. Similarly, the
English Bill of Rights refers to the right of individual protestant
“Subjects” to “have Arms for their Defence”84 There is no difference in
meaning between “their defense” and “in defense of themselves.”
(4) It is true that the founders used “no person” and “any person” in the Fifth
Amendment to refer to individuals, but this is a grammatical
consequence of shifting from affirming that everyone has a particular
right to a claim about particular individuals not being denied a right. In
the absence of direct and compelling historical evidence to the contrary,
nothing in the public meaning would turn on this grammatical flip
between the Fourth Amendment, on the one hand, and First, Second and
Fifth Amendments on the other.
(5) Consider this language from the very same 1776 Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights in which the “in defense of themselves” language
appears: “[T]he people have a right to hold themselves, their houses,
papers, and possessions free from search and seizure; and therefore
warrants without oaths or affirmations first made, affording a sufficient
83
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foundation for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any
person or persons, his or their property, not particularly described, are
contrary to that right, and ought not to be granted.”85 Did the use of the
term “themselves” imply that the reference here is to “the community”
rather than to individual rights? Hardly. The last portion of this statute
refutes any such suggestion. Nearly identical language appears in the
1777 Vermont Constitution.86 Other state constitutional protections from
unreasonable searches refer to “every subject” with no apparent
difference in meaning.87 Or consider this from the 1780 Massachusetts
Constitution: “that the judges of the supreme judicial court should hold
their offices as long as they behave themselves well; and that they should
have honorable salaries ascertained and established by standing laws.”88
(6) As was already discussed, language expressing “in defense of the
community” was readily available and in use in, for example, the
Massachusetts constitution that refers to “a right to keep and bear arms
for the common defense” — qualifying language that was proposed and
rejected in the Senate as an amendment to the Second Amendment.89
(7) Finally, this interpretation of “in defense of themselves” leads to a bizarre
interpretation of the Pennsylvania minority report itself that Uviller and
Merkel, and others, claim to be a pure (and radical, exceptional, and
rejected) statement of individual rights. By this interpretation even the
Pennsylvania dissenters did not seek to protect an individual right of self
defense! We would be asked to believe that they sought instead to
protect the right to defend the community (“in defense of themselves”),
the right to defend the state (“and their own state” — notice the use of
the word “their,” by the way, as in the Fourth Amendment), and the right
to kill game, but not the right to arms for personal self defense. This
interpretation would not only be bizarre, it would contradict Uviller and
Merkel’s repeated aspersion that the Pennsylvania dissenters were weird
radicals and anarchists because they asserted an individual right to keep
and bear arms.
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E. Evidence of Congressional Usage
By the end of the book, the authors get a little carried away and assert that
“[t]o the ratifiers, bearing arms unequivocally meant rendering military
service.”90 As we have seen, the examples discussed and others they omit include
numerous uses of the term outside the military context. With one exception, no
quantitative evidence is presented here to show that these uses were aberrant.91
The exception is found in a footnote, where the authors quote from an article by
David Yassky in which he reports searching “a Library of Congress database
containing all official records of debates in the Continental and U.S. Congress
between 1774 and 1821” and finding that “the phrase had an unambiguously
military meaning.”92 Yassky’s quantitative survey is highly relevant to the issue
of whether the original public meaning of “bear arms” included a military
connotation. It establishes this uncontroverted claim beyond any doubt. But as
proof that the term had an exclusively military connotation—a much harder claim
to establish—it is far from dispositive. The problem is to establish the relevant
baseline in the database Yassky used.
My own search of this database generally confirms that the discussions in
which “bear arms” appears (not including references to the Second Amendment)
in the period searched by Professor Yassky do indeed concern only military
matters.93 But this cannot establish, as Yassky asserts, that during this period
“the phrase had an unambiguously military meaning.” Why not? Because if the
90
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Uviller and Merkel claim everyone but a few radicals thought it meant.
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only discussions in Congress of arms during this period were in a military
context, then this database cannot tell us whether the term “bear arms” would be
understood as also having a nonmilitary meaning outside a discussion of military
matters. In other words, if only military matters were under discussion when
arms were mentioned in Congress during this period, then it follows from this
fact—and not from any exclusive meaning of the phrase “bear arms” — that all
uses of the phrase “bear arms” during this period in this database would
necessarily be military.
To test this proposition, I searched for a phrase that Uviller and Merkel might
concede to have a nonmilitary connotation, like “carry arms,” “possess arms,”
and “have arms” and found just one nonmilitary result.94 Significantly, I also
found no references at all in this database to “keep arms” besides one (garbled)
reference to the Second Amendment.95 This finding further suggests both (1) that
the discussions in this database during this period were exclusively about military
matters so we would expect “bear arms” to be used only in its military sense and
(2) that “keep arms” did not have a commonly employed military connotation.96
Professor Yassky’s findings should not be surprising. Given the narrowly
interpreted powers of Congress during the era he surveyed — 1774–1821 — it is
hardly unexpected that Congressional debates would only be discussing arms in a
military context. Congress had neither the inclination nor the power to propose
laws that would have affected the personal right to keep or bear arms outside the
militia context. Besides, it was constitutionally barred from doing so by the
Second Amendment.
Furthermore, since Professor Yassky did his search, the Library of Congress
database now extends to 1875 and covers the tumultuous years before, during,
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and after the Civil War when the personal nonmilitary rights of blacks and others
to keep and bear arms were perceived as threatened from a variety of sources.
Sure enough, four examples of the word “bear arms” appear in this era to refer to
a personal right outside the context of the militia. All of these examples
substantiate the proposition that, when Congress was discussing nonmilitary
matters that concerned the right to arms, the phrase “bear arms” was deemed
perfectly appropriate.
On June 28, 1856, Representative Alexander H. Stephens proposed a section
consisting of a comprehensive list of individual rights as part of a lengthy
amendment to the pending bill admitting Kansas into the Union, which stated
“And be it further enacted . . . the people of said Territory shall be entitled to the
right to keep and bear arms, to the liberty of speech and of the press, as defined
in the constitution of the United States, and all other rights of person or property
thereby declared and as thereby defined.”97 No mention is made of the militia,
and a militia preface like that found in the Second Amendment is absent. Bear
arms is clearly being used in a nonmilitary context.
In 1861, Reresentative Clement Vallandigham of Virginia announced his
intention to introduce the following legislation, the specific nature of which is not
specified:
A bill to regulate and enforce the writ of habeas corpus, and for the
better securing the liberty of the citizens;
Also, a bill to enforce the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures;
Also, a bill to secure to the people the right to keep and bear arms for
their defence;
Also, a bill to prescribe the manner of quartering soldiers in private
houses in time of war;
Also, a bill to secure the freedom of speech and of the press.98
Here too, any militia preface is omitted, and “bear arms” is nonmilitary.
In 1864, Garrett Davis of Kentucky introduced a resolution containing the
following in the Senate:
14. Resolved, That the present executive government of the United
States has subverted, for the time, in large portions of the loyal States,
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the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, and free suffrage, the
constitutions and laws of the States and of the United States, the civil
courts and trial by jury; it has ordered, ad libitum, arbitrary arrests by
military officers, not only without warrant, but without any charge or
imputation of crime or offence; and has hurried the persons so arrested
from home and vicinage to distant prisons and kept them incarcerated
there for an indefinite time; some of whom it discharged without trial,
and in utter ignorance of the cause of their arrest and imprisonment;
and others it caused to be brought before courts created by itself, and
to be tried and punished without law, in violation of the constitutional
guarantee to the citizen of his right to keep and bear arms, and of his
rights of property . . . . ; all of which must be repudiated and swept
away by the sovereign people.99
The militia is not mentioned in the litany of alleged violations of individual and
personal rights contained in this resolution. The context is entirely nonmilitary.
On April 19, 1872, President Grant addressed Congress in a lengthy message
regarding the lawless activities in certain portions of South Carolina. The
President listed numerous deprivations of individual rights arising “under the
sway of [a] powerful combination, properly known as [the] “Klu-Klux-Klan,” the
objects of which were, by force and terror, . . . to deprive colored citizens of the
right to bear arms.”100 Clearly, this reference to a right to bear arms,
unaccompanied by a right to keep arms, is outside the militia context. Such
abuses of privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States is what
motivated Congress to propose the Fourteenth Amendment.101
True, all these nonmilitary uses of “bear arms” occurred long after the founding,
but any assertion that the meaning of “bear arms” had changed at some
unspecified interval assumes what must be proved: that the phrase “bear arms”
had at the founding an exclusively military meaning — especially when
conjoined with a right to keep arms — that was subsequently broadened to
include nonmilitary usages as well. Evidence that such a change occurred is
nonexistent.
In this regard, it bears repeating that neither the authors nor Garry Wills
present not a single example of any person from the founding era or immediately
thereafter who suggested that the right to “keep and bear arms” was exclusively a
military right. While there are numerous examples of the right being used more
broadly, such as the statements by Nasson and Belknap quoted above, there is no
99
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record of anyone at the time asserting that the right in the Second Amendment
was as narrow or conditioned as the authors claim. Three types of statements
could directly evidence their empirical claim that the original meaning of the
right was exclusively a military one:
(a) A statement asserting the opinion of the speaker that the right to keep and
bear arms in the Second Amendment is conditioned on the continued
existence of an organized militia;
(b) A statement explicitly rejecting the assertions of the importance of an
individual right to keep and bear arms independent of an organized
militia;
(c) A statement decrying the Second Amendment for having rejected the
individual right to keep and bear arms for their own as well as common
defense in favor of a purely militia-conditioned right.
No such statements are presented. Had Uviller and Merkel done so, it would
have made them the first anti-gun-rights scholars to have produced direct
evidence of anyone actually holding the view they claim everyone (or nearly
everyone) held. At this point no such direct evidence is known to exist.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE TEXT
None of the discussion in Part II is intended to suggest that the term “bear
arms” did not also include a military connotation, but only to establish that it had
a broader meaning as well that the public would reasonably have attributed to it
unless the right was qualified expressly, which the Senate declined to do. In
addition, the right “to keep” arms had no obvious military connotation. If it
establishes nothing else, the evidence presented in Part II also shows that the
unconditioned individual rights interpretation of the amendment can be found in
the historical record and is no invention of the NRA—an organization that
Uviller and Merkel mention derisively—or of individual rights scholars, who the
authors repeatedly disparage throughout the book as “advocates”102 rather than
historians — or worse.103
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At its root, and despite the pages of historical narrative, Uviller and Merkel’s
argument that the Second Amendment fell silent is not based on any new or
direct evidence of original meaning. Apart from ritualistic invocations of
“historical context,” and various assertions about the meaning of “bear arms,” the
authors’ argument rests almost entirely on their own analysis of its wording.
“[A]s a matter of textual analysis,” they contend, “we regard it as highly
significant that of the several great entitlements enunciated in the first eight
Amendments, no other is hedged by a conditional or explanative clause.”104
Elsewhere they claim: “We have . . . a clear and unequivocal expression of
the linguistic context of the primary right in the introductory phrase that
accompanies it.”105 Obviously this is wishful hyperbole. If the right to arms had
been made explicitly conditional on participation in the militia, we would not be
having this debate. The authors claim that the Second Amendment “guaranteed
the right to keep and bear arms in the militia,”106 but the last three qualifying
words simply do not appear there or elsewhere.
At one point Uviller and Merkel go so far as to claim: “Had the two
statements — regarding the importance of a militia and the right to arms — not
been joined in this manner, it might have been possible to argue that even if the
first declaration ceases to be true, the second is undiminished.”107 Yet none of
the precursors of the Second Amendment — including Madison’s proposal to
Congress — are worded in the grammatical fashion that the authors find so
significant. This does not prevent them, with equal ardor, from insisting that
these formulations too “expressly linked” the right to arms to militia service.108
The Founders, however, were quite capable of expressly qualifying an
individual right—indeed to qualify a right by military service. They did just this
in the Fifth Amendment when they specified an individual right not to be
prosecuted without an indictment by the grand jury “except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger. . . .”109 In other words, unlike the Second Amendment, the Fifth
Amendment right to an indictment is expressly conditioned on whether or not a
defendant is in actual militia service. And as already noted, the Senate rejected
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the proposal that would have expressly qualified the exercise of the right to be
“for the common defense.”110
Eugene Volokh has chronicled how prefacing constitutional rights with
affirmations of purposes was quite common in state constitutions of the day.111
For example, the New Hampshire Constitution of 1783 read: “The Liberty of the
press is essential to the security of freedom in a State; it ought, therefore, to be
inviolably preserved.”112 Lest any weight be placed on the use of a semicolon,
the nearly identical passage from the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 reads:
“The Liberty of the Press is essential to the security of freedom in a State, it
ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this Commonwealth.”113
The authors note these state constitutions but dismiss this evidence on the
sole ground that “the Second Amendment remains unique among the federal Bill
of Rights.”114 But this misses the significance of Professor Volokh’s evidence
for the original public meaning of the Second Amendment. These state
constitutional rights provisions show that “to eighteenth century ears” (using the
authors’ phrase) such language was not uncommon and, so far as we know, was
not elsewhere interpreted to limit or condition the right that followed. Their
denials notwithstanding, this evidence does indeed bear on the original public
meaning of the Second Amendment.
None of this is to suggest that the authors’ purely textualist analysis is
absurd. To the contrary, it is the most plausible argument the anti-gun-rights
opponents have raised to date because they finally concede that the right was one
held by individuals not by state governments. But neither is it compelling. The
fact that the right to arms was not made expressly conditioned on the preface
110
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strongly suggests that it was not so conditioned. It is precisely when plausible
doubts are raised about the proper interpretation of text that evidence of original
public meaning becomes important. As we have seen, ample evidence exists to
suggest that the right to keep and bear arms existed apart from active service in a
militia for the common defense, and reasonable members of the public would
have and did so read it.
Even if Uviller and Merkel are correct that the right to keep and bear arms is
conditioned on the continued existence of a general militia-of-the-whole, this
raises the question of whether they are also right to claim that such a militia no
longer exists, a claim to which I shall return after briefly considering two other
problems with their treatment.
IV. WAS THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS AMONG THE PRIVILEGES OR
IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS?
The right to keep and bear arms, whatever its proper scope, like the rest of
the Bill of Rights, was originally a constraint only on federal power, not that of
states. This structural feature of the original Constitution was fundamentally
altered by the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment that dictates that “No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”115 The question arises whether
the right to bear arms was among these privileges or immunities.
The authors vehemently deny this possibility on two grounds. First, because
the right to arms was not specifically mentioned. Of course no particular right is
specified as a privilege or immunity, so this objection would wipe the clause
from the Constitution entirely. Even the Supreme Court in its atrocious five-tofour decision in The Slaughter-House Cases116 did not go this far.117
Understanding the original meaning of “privileges or immunities” requires
evidence of public meaning. Unfortunately, the authors rely for their evidence
solely on the work of Raoul Berger. While Berger never made up evidence, as
was done by historian Michael Bellesiles,118 one must always take Berger’s
115
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claims with a very large pinch of salt, and carefully check the sources for context.
The authors seem unaware of the refutation of Berger’s thesis in the pathbreaking
work of Michael Kent Curtis, especially his influential book (also published by
Duke), No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of
Rights.119
Though not every scholar has been completely persuaded by Curtis’s
refutation of Berger’s thesis, his conclusions have been widely accepted and have
reshaped the current debate over the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. While I will not summarize his argument or evidence here, Curtis
has shown that the primary purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
to reverse Barron v. Baltimore120 and extend federal protection against state
violations of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights — especially including the
right to keep and bear arms — and other rights as well.121 The lack of any
reference to Curtis’ work, and the paucity of their own sources, severely
undermines the authors’ confident assertions about the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even if Uviller and Merkel were correct about the founding, by 1868 the
individual right to arms was certainly not a militia-conditioned one, especially as
free blacks and southern Republicans suffered abuses at the hands of white
militiamen. As Chief Justice Taney’s 1856 opinion reflects, the right to bear
arms was the right “to keep and carry arms” wherever one goes.122 Though
Michael Curtis is no gun rights advocate, he repeatedly references statements that
include the right to keep and bear arms among those rights protected by the
Constitution.123 For example, the Freedman’s Bureau Act of 1866, approved by a
supermajority of Congress over a Presidential veto, provided that:

with favor, even emphasizing at one point his receipt of the now-revoked Bancroft Prize.
See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 2, at 292 n.54. While acknowledging some of
Bellesiles’ now-vindicated critics, in the same footnote they discount the significance of
their contrary findings.
119
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986).
120
32 U.S. 243 (1833).
121
In my writings, I have shown how “privileges or immunities” includes the natural
rights retained by the people as well as additional privileges established by the Bill of
Rights. See Barnett, supra note 4, at 60-68 As the right to keep and bear arms is
included in the Bill of Rights, however, it is unnecessary to accept this historical claim to
concur that it was included among the privileges or immunities of citizens.
122
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 417 (1856).
123
See CURTIS, supra note 119, at 52, 53, 56, 72, 88, 104, 111, 112, 138, 140–41, 164,
167, 178–79, 187, 203, 217, and 238 (discussing references to the right to arms in the
context of the drafting and ratifying of the Fourteenth Amendment).

[T]he right . . . to have full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the
acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal,
including the constitutional right to keep and bear arms, shall be
secured to and enjoyed by all citizens of such State or district without
regard to race or color or previous condition of slavery.124
In 1866 the protection of the individual non-militia-conditioned right to arms for
personal security was no secret privilege or immunity of citizenship.
V. IS THE RIGHT TO ARMS SUBJECT TO REASONABLE REGULATION?
Uviller and Merkel repeatedly assert that finding the right to arms to be an
individual right unconditioned on the existence of the militia is a radical claim
because such a right would not be subject to reasonable regulation. Thus, they
refer to the individual rights position as entailing an “unbridled right,”125 an
“absolute right,”126 “an individual entitlement immune from government
curtailment,”127 an “unfettered general license to carry weapons,”128 an
“unrestricted right to weapons,”129 “individual license” that “prohibit[s] any
interference”130 with a right that would be “immune to government restriction
and regulation,”131 and “free of any government control of arms.”132
Despite these polemics, the authors know better. In a footnote referring to
Laurence Tribe, Akhil Amar, and William Van Alstyne, the authors acknowledge
that: “Preeminently, three of the most respected members of the orthodox legal
academy to embrace an individual rights reading of the Second Amendment
emphasize that this right—like the other individual rights protected in the first
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eight amendments—should be subject to reasonable regulation.”133 Disturbingly,
the authors fail to mention that virtually all individual rights scholars, including
the others cited in the same footnote, hold the position that an individual right
may be subject to regulation.134 Indeed, I know of no individual rights scholar
who claims that the Second Amendment is any more absolute than is the First
Amendment.
This is evidenced by a 1993 advertisement taken out in major journals by
“Academics for the Second Amendment” and jointly signed by most individual
rights scholars. The text of this advertisement appears in an article cited by
Uviller and Merkel earlier in the same footnote that concedes the reasonableness
of Tribe, Amar, and Van Alstyne.135 In this article, which Uviller and Merkel
find important enough to criticize elsewhere in their text,136 the following
sentence of the advertisement is italicized: “Of course, the right to bear arms is
no more ‘absolute’ than is the right to speak, to publish, or to assemble.”137 This
advertisement merely evidences the fact that most individual rights scholars of
the Second Amendment have taken the view the authors mysteriously attribute
only to Tribe, Amar and Van Alstyne. For this reason, Uviller and Merkel are
unable to produce a single example of any individual rights scholar who contends
otherwise.
One suspects they omit this fact about other individual rights scholars—
whom they never call “scholars,” much less “respected”—so they can repeatedly
belittle them as “advocates,”138 or a “dedicated band of individual rights
advocates,”139 or “a growing entourage of individualist interpreters of the Second
Amendment.”140 Indeed, when mentioning historian Professor Joyce Malcolm,
whose book To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right
was published by Harvard University Press, they go so far as to mention that
Bentley College where she teaches is “an undergraduate business school in
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Massachusetts.”141 Though individual rights scholars have come to expect such
cheap shots from their academic opponents, it still disappoints.
At this point, some readers may be scratching their heads and wondering, if
an individual right to keep and bear arms is subject to reasonable regulation, what
is all the excitement about? Why do not gun control proponents simply embrace
the original meaning of the right and then propose what regulations they wish?
The answer is simple. Were they to do so under current doctrine, such
regulations would be subjected to the same scrutiny as laws restricting the liberty
of speech and the press. Within the modern theory of constitutional rights, as
articulated in the famous Footnote Four of U.S. v. Carolene Products:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.142
Despite this injunction, the Second Amendment has never been held by the
Supreme Court to be among those specific prohibitions that shift the presumption
of constitutionality. The centrality of the doctrine articulated in Footnote Four to
the modern theory of constitutional rights explains why so much energy has been
expended to show that the right to keep and bear arms is not “a specific
prohibition of the of the Constitution.”143 Proponents of gun control wish to
avoid the scrutiny that Footnote Four would require.
So here is the position held by individual rights scholars that Uviller and
Merkel fail to acknowledge, much less meet: The fact that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right means only that the government must
establish the necessity and propriety of its regulations as it must do when
adopting time, place, and manner restrictions on the freedom of speech. And the
right bars the complete prohibition and confiscation of all private firearms
suitable for self-defense, a goal so radical that most gun control enthusiasts deny
they favor it.144 In other words, properly construed, an individual-rights reading
of the Second Amendment prevents rather than proposes a radical policy
measure—as evidenced by the fact that on three occasions Congress passed
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statutes expressly recognizing the Amendment as protecting an individual right
unconditioned on militia service.145
VI. IS THE MILITIA GONE?
Notwithstanding all the evidence presented above, suppose Uviller and
Merkel are correct in their claim that the right to keep and bear arms in the
Second Amendment was somehow conditioned on service in the militia. Even
were this true, their case would still depend on how “militia” is defined in the
amendment, and whether it no longer exists. Therefore, after their assertion that
the right to bear arms is conditioned on the continued existence of the militia,
Uviller and Merkel’s next most important claim is that, because the militia has
been abolished, the condition for the exercise of the right no longer exists and the
Second Amendment has fallen silent:
[W]ith no contemporary descendent to inherit the Framers’ concept of
a republican militia, the incidental right of citizens to bear and keep
the arms necessary to the life of such a militia has atrophied; it has
simply fallen silent in the midst of the tumultuous debate on the issue
in today’s world.146
How then do they define the term “militia”?
As we have recounted—and as all scholars agree—the founding
generation of Americans conceived of a militia as a group composed
of all free white males between eighteen and forty-five (except for the
conscientious objectors and others entitled to an exemption),
responding willingly, as needed, for the common defense, at the call
of local authority, and above all, as a viable alternative to the feared
standing army.147
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Now it is possible to quarrel with this definition. At the end, for example, it
seems to build into the definition of militia that “above all” it must be a “viable
alternative” to a standing army suggesting that if it is not then it is not truly a
“militia.” If by “viable alternative” the authors have in mind something like an
“effective substitute,” they cannot mean this seriously. Such a definition runs
afoul of the Constitution itself which affirms both the existence of the militia and
the power to create a standing army that was also needed for national defense. In
the Constitution, a “well-regulated” militia is clearly viewed as an auxiliary to a
standing army. The militia can be called into action either to augment the Army
or when regular forces are preoccupied with other matters or cannot be on the
scene as fast as locals.148
With this caveat to one side, Uviller and Merkel acknowledge, correctly, that
the original militia to which the Second Amendment refers is not the select
militia of the National Guard, but instead is what they repeatedly call the
“militia-of-the-whole.”149 Are they then correct to claim, as they do at
considerable length, that the militia to which the Second Amendment refers no
longer exists — “that there is no contemporary, evolved, descendent of the
eighteenth-century ‘militia’ on today’s landscape”?150 It turns out that (if one
omits the unwarranted word “evolved” from this claim), according to the current
laws of the United States as enacted by Congress, they are wrong.
Section 311 of the United States Code, Title 10, entitled “Militia:
composition and classes,” reads in its entirety as follows:
(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least
17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under
45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to
become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United
States who are members of the National Guard.
(b) The classes of the militia are —
(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the
Naval Militia; and
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(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia
who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.151
So far as federal law is concerned, then, the militia-of-the-whole continues to
exist.
Given its obvious relevance to their central claim, what do the authors say
about this statute? Actually, they fail to mention it.152 Though they note the
distinction adopted by statute in 1903 between the “active militia” and “an
unorganized militia (the nonenrolled male population between eighteen and
forty-five),”153 they twice repeat a claim taken from a 1940s law review article
that in 1933 “Congress made the National Guard part of the regular army during
peace as well as wartime . . . and erased the word ‘militia’ from the War
Department charts, changing the name of the supervisory agency to National
Guard Bureau.”154 So far as I know, this claim is not actually false, but it
certainly is misleading to use it to suggest that the class of militia defined by
statute in 1903 as “unorganized militia” no longer exists as a matter of federal
law. To the contrary, we have seen that it continues to be recognized in the
United States Code.
The authors might respond that this is not the “republican” militia they and
the Founders had in mind: a “well regulated” militia that is be properly trained
and drilled. But the federal government retains the power to train and discipline
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the militia if it so chooses.155 What the federal government cannot do — if we
are to take the preface to the Second Amendment seriously—or at least it has not
done, is abolish the militia altogether rather than to leave it unorganized.
The irony is that, although the author’s entire thesis depends upon the
presence in the Second Amendment of the militia preface, they fail to realize that
the preface, if taken seriously, would constitutionally bar the abolition of the
militia-of-the-whole, thus fatally undermining their claim that the Second
Amendment has fallen silent. No matter what Congress might do in the future,
the militia-of-the-whole would continue to exist in a constitutional sense, despite
its being unorganized and not well-regulated.
Much of their book is devoted to discussing the obsolescence of this body-ofthe-whole militia. They devote chapters to its early ineffectiveness, for example,
in stopping the British invasion of Washington in 1812, colorfully noting that the
British soldiers consumed the dinner at the White House that had been prepared
for President Madison and his wife. As for today’s militia, they write:
In the years since World War II, the role of a mass reserve in assuring
national security has seriously diminished in consideration of the
technical complexity of equipment and tasks required of a thoroughly
professional modern army, and because nuclear deterrence has made a
mass war drawing on all the personnel reserve of the country unlikely.
The need for a whole nation in arms has — in all likelihood,
permanently — disappeared.156
“Indeed,” they confidently assert, “it would be difficult to conceive of any
institution less necessary to the security of the fifty free states at the beginning of
the new millennium than the vanished common militia.”157
On September 11th of 2001, however, the United States came under aerial
attack by planes piloted by foreign nationals. Two planes struck the World Trade
Center destroying it and, with it, thousands of innocent civilians inside. Another
struck the Pentagon killing hundreds of members of the armed forces. A fourth
plane, United Flight 93, was heading for the nation’s capital with the likely target
being the White House. It was stopped from reaching its target, but not by the
Army, Navy, or even the Air Force. Nor was it stopped by the National Guard or
the armed constabulary of the District of Columbia. After all, these official
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personnel cannot be everywhere the nation is threatened. No, unlike 1812, this
time the White House was saved from possible destruction by the heroics of
members of the “unorganized militia”158 who, after learning on their cell phones
of the attacks by other planes, acted in concert to protect the capital from a
second successful attack in the same morning at the cost of their own lives.159
VII. CONCLUSION
Uviller and Merkel’s book adds no new historical evidence to the debate over
the original meaning of the Second Amendment. Instead, resting their argument
almost exclusively on historical “context” and parsing of text, they propose that
the right to keep and bear arms was expressly conditioned on its exercise as part
of a militia that no longer exists.
This interpretation is belied by
contemporaneous statements about the nature of the right and the meaning of the
Amendment before, during, and after its ratification, by evidence of later usage,
by the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, by repeated affirmations
by Congress, and by the current statutes of the United States.
Notwithstanding their opinion that “it would be difficult to conceive of any
institution less necessary to the security of the fifty free states at the beginning of
the new millennium”160 than the now-disorganized common militia, we may just
need the militia again one day, as we did on September 11th. When we do, it
may well be under circumstances where it would be better if its members have
access to their own weapons to arm themselves. Fortunately, as the evidence
shows, the founders had the foresight to enshrine an individual right of the people
to keep and bear arms in the Constitution when they added the Second
Amendment. Though it has often been ignored by courts161 and sometimes
squelched by scholars like Richard Uviller, William Merkel, or Garry Wills who
wish it was not there, the Second Amendment has not been repealed and it has
never fallen silent.
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Lest I be misunderstood, I do not offer this example to suggest that airplane passengers
should be armed, or that a proper interpretation of the Second Amendment would make
disarming them unconstitutional. I offer it only to show that Uviller and Merkel are
wrong to assert that, because the nature of warfare has changed, the militia-of-the-whole
is no longer and will never again be needed to assist in providing for the common defense
of the United States. At the least, reasonable people can disagree with their claim.
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